Abstract. After the establishment of Shanghai Free Trade Zone, the effect of foreign banks' entry on the efficiency of domestic commercial banks in China has become more evident. Choosing the first 7 domestic banks in Shanghai Free Trade Zone as study subjects this paper uses the double-effect model to confirm the existence of the moderate level of foreign banks' entry .At the same time, with the cross items of foreign banks' market share and owner structure (FORO), foreign banks' market share and zone(FORZ), this paper found that when compared with joint-equity banks, the large state-owned commercial banks are found to be the quickest to enhance safety and there is no difference from whether the headquarters of domestic commercial banks are in the same place as Shanghai Free Trade Zone.
Introduction
The establishment of Shanghai Free Trade Zone in September, 2013 implies a brand new stage of the policy and new measures such as negative list make it more convenient for foreign banks to enter the Chinese market, which attracts the public attention towards its effect. Most scholars support that there is a positive effect on the efficiency of domestic commercial banks in China, but other researchers believe otherwise. Compared with previous literature, this paper makes some progress in that it is based on Shanghai Free Trade Zone, uses the double-effect model and the regional factor to study the positive and negative effects as well as the preference for regional protectionism in the zone.
Literature
The moderate level of foreign banks' entry refers to a critical level to which causes a directional change on the efficiency of domestic commercial banks. Lensink and Hermes (2004) used the banks' data from 1990 to 1996 in different countries with different economic levels to find that foreign banks' entry into developing countries usually increases domestic commercial banks' operating costs, while the influence is insignificant in developed countries. Ito (2006) made an empirical test on the data from 1980 to 2000 in 87 different developing countries, finding that the institutional improvement is the decisive factor. Gorton & Winton (1998) , Kaas (2004) and Lehner & Schnitzer (2008) respectively used the welfare economics, the space model in loan market and the Salop model to theoretically demonstrate the positive effect of foreign banks' entry. Choosing 1900 banks from 1988 to1995 in 80 different countries as subjects, Classens etc (2001) found that foreign banks' entry breaks monopoly of domestic banks and enhances competition. For negative effect, Stiglitz (1993) first pointed out that foreign banks' entry would result in a potential cost which may worsen the efficiency of domestic banks. Zajc (2002) discovered that foreign banks' entry caused the increase of indirect cost and the decrease of non-interest income for domestic commercial banks. To sum up, the literature show that the coexistence of both the catfish effect and the cherry-picking effect makes it evident that there is a moderate level of foreign banks' entry, so it is not advisable to only study the positive or negative effect since it masks the dynamic relation between foreign banks' entry and the efficiency of domestic commercial banks in China in the same framework.
Hypothesis
The efficiency of domestic commercial banks can be affected by macroeconomic development, industrial situation and banks' own characters. Other things being equal, for example the characters of domestic commercial banks and domestic economy being constant, the effect of foreign banks is furthered by the relaxation of conditions on entry. The catfish effect will be evident when the level of foreign banks' entry is below the critical value, being the maximum when at the critical value and when it is beyond the critical value, the cherry-picking effect will become evident. Therefore, based on the above analysis, we put forward the hypothesis Ⅰ . There is a moderate level of foreign banks' entry, which means that the effect of foreign banks' entry will be changed towards different directions with the further entry of foreign banks. According to the super property right by Martin & Parker (1997) and Hay & Liu (1997) , market competition instead of the nature of property right is the main motivation to enhance commercial banks' efficiency, but the nature of property right plays a much more important role in Chinese commercial banking especially for those state-owned commercial banks. Therefore, we put forward the hypothesis Ⅱ . There is a difference among banks with different structure of property right in China when faced with foreign banks' entry. China's first Free Trade Zone is located in Shanghai because of its special economic status, geographic position and culture. The purpose of establishing Shanghai Free Trade Zone is to further open the market and to attract more foreign companies into the zone with the same conditions, Based on the above analysis, we put forward the hypothesis Ⅲ . There is no difference concerning whether the headquarters of domestic commercial banks in China are in Shanghai, which means there is no preference for regional protectionism with Shanghai Free Trade Zone.
Empirical Analysis
We choose the first 7 Chinese commercial banks in Shanghai Free Trade Zone in order to study the effect of foreign banks' entry. We choose operating costs rate (ECM), profit margin of total assets (PRTA) and non-performing loan rate (NPLR) as the variables to represent efficiency, the ratio of the foreign banks' assets to the total assets of banks (FOR) symbols the level of foreign banks' entry, market share (MS) and GDP growth rate (GDPGR) are controlling variables and China's banks' structure of ownership (OWN) and the place of headquarters of China's banks (ZONE) are dummy variables . To confirm double effects, we use cross items like foreign banks' market share and owner structure (FORO) and its squares (FOROS), foreign banks' market share and zone (FORZ) and its squares (FORZS). The model takes the form as Eq. 1-3. Table 1 . As far as the hypothesis Ⅰ is concerned, it can be seen from Table 1 that in the regression of ECM, the coefficients of FOR and FORS are -3.537072 and 102.7398 respectively. This indicates that the existence of double effects is statistically significant at the 10% level of significance. In other words, the effects of foreign banks' entry on costs can be described as U curve, which confirms the existence of the moderate level for the entry of foreign banks. However, the premise of the catfish effect is that the level of foreign banks' entry should be below the moderate level, and if the entry level is beyond the moderate one, domestic commercial banks may be faced with the threat of increasing costs. For the hypothesis Ⅱ , in the regression of ECM and PRTA, Table 1 shows that the cross item of foreign banks' market share and its squares with ownership are not statistically significant. That is to say, in terms of the operating cost and profits, the difference in ownership doesn't make a difference between state-owned commercial banks and joint-equity ones, which is consistent with Hou and Zhang (2008). . FOR ＊ is the moderate level of foreign banks' entry, T ɑ/2 is the bilateral t value in confidence of 1-ɑ, S for is the standard deviation of foreign banks' market share. The interval is calculated to be [0.89%, 2.55%]. That is to say, when the level of foreign banks' entry is within this interval, the positive effect on the efficiency of domestic commercial banks in China will be dominant. When the level is below 0.89%, the positive effect is not fully showed and the market should be opened further. When the level is beyond 2.55%, the government should enhance supervision towards foreign banks' entry.
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